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Research summary. This paper examines the relationship between strategic decision-making at the
subsidiary level and organizational structure. In many organizations, headquarters and subsidiaries
are separated by intermediate subsidiaries. Building on the attention-based view of the rm, we argue
that the greater the organizational distance of a focal subsidiary from headquarters (measured by
the number of intermediate subsidiaries separating the subsidiary from headquarters), the lower the
attention that headquarters devote to the subsidiary. Thus, subsidiary autonomy from headquarters
increases with organizational distance. Using a large comprehensive dataset on the structure of corpo-
rate groups in Western Europe, we provide several pieces of evidence consistent with these hypotheses.
By contrast, we nd little support for the view that tall pyramids are created to magnify the voting
control of large shareholders.
Managerial summary. Corporate groups confederations of legally independent rms linked via
ownership ties are common around the world. An important function of headquarters in corporate
groups is to allocate resources among member rms. We argue that, because headquarters mostly
focus on allocating resources among units that they directly own, subsidiaries near the top of the group
perform di¤erently in response to changing external conditions than similar una¢ liated rms. This
di¤erence declines as one moves down the group pyramid, as lower-level a¢ liates receive less attention
from headquarters. An analysis of a large comprehensive dataset on the structure of corporate groups
in Western Europe supports these predictions. The paper suggests that the legal organization of groups
is a useful instrument to channel limited headquarters attention to selected a¢ liates.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the relationship between strategic decision-making at the subsidiary level and or-
ganizational structure. Recent work on the determinants of subsidiary autonomy has emphasized factors
such as subsidiary capabilities and the balance of power between headquarters and subsidiaries (Martinez
and Jarillo, 1989; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Birkinshaw, 1996; Ambos, Andersson and Birkinshaw,
2010), but has largely neglected structural dimensions of organizational control emphasized in founda-
tional work (Chandler, 1962; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Stopford and Wells, 1972; Ghoshal and Nohria,
1989; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a).
Building on the attention-based view of the rm (March and Simon, 1958; Ocasio, 1997; Bouquet
and Birkinshaw, 2008b; Bouquet, Morrison and Birkinshaw, 2009; Joseph and Ocasio, 2012), this paper
makes two main contributions: (i) it provides a framework for understanding how managerial attention
is distributed in corporate groups and (ii) presents three distinct pieces of evidence consistent with the
proposed framework. Specically, we propose that organizational distance the number of intermediate
subsidiaries separating a focal subsidiary from headquarters is a useful construct to gauge the level of
strategic autonomy that the focal subsidiary will enjoy.
Corporate groups confederations of legally independent rms linked together via ownership ties are
a prevalent form of organization in both the developed and the developing world (La Porta, Shleifer and
Lopez de Silanes, 1999; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010).1 To a rst approxi-
mation, corporate groups exhibit a pyramidal structure, with an ultimate owner (typically a wealthy
family, a widely-held corporation, or the state) controlling chains of subsidiary rms. Headquarters per-
form two fundamental tasks in these structures: they allocate resources across units, and monitor the
performance of these units (Bower, 1970; Collis,Young and Goold, 2007). Thus, headquarters attention in
these structures can be conceptualized at least partly as the extent to which headquarters are involved in
the allocation of budgets and in scrutinizing the subsidiariesstrategic plans. The less they are involved,
the more the subsidiaries will enjoy autonomy, especially when it comes to large investment decisions.
We argue that, as groups expand into related and unrelated businesses, the complexity of managing a
1For instance, General Electric owns (directly or indirectly) 1,311 subsidiaries (21% domestic) and is therefore part of a
corporate group. The ten largest American industrial corporations own 5,113 subsidiaries, of which 33% are domestic. The
ten largest industrial British corporations own 4,669 subsidiaries (27% are domestic), the ten largest French corporations
own 7,821 subsidiaries (34% are domestic), and the largest ten industrial German corporations own 5,214 subsidiaries (29%
domestic).
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diverse set of businesses will overwhelm the information processing capacity of headquarters (Chandler,
1962; Simon, 1962; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a). To mitigate this problem, headquarters will selec-
tively allocate their attention. Because the attention structure of an organization often echoes its formal
structure (Joseph and Ocasio, 2012; Joseph and Wilson, 2018), we propose that greater organizational
distance between a focal subsidiary and headquarters will be associated with lower levels of headquarters
attention towards the subsidiary. Thus, organizationally distant subsidiaries will enjoy greater levels of
autonomy than organizationally close subsidiaries.
Subsidiary autonomy may increase with organizational distance (measured by the number of interme-
diate a¢ liates separating the apex rm from the focal subsidiary) because: (i) organizational distance is
inversely related to top managements interest and involvement in the subsidiary and (ii) organizational
distance creates communication and governance frictions that reduce the e¤ectiveness of central control
(Stopford and Wells, 1972; Bethel and Liebeskind, 1998). Headquarters may delegate parenting respon-
sibilities to intermediate units. However, the mandate of intermediate parents is likely to be restricted to
specic industries and geographies (Stopford and Wells, 1972). Because subsidiaries near the bottom of
the group pyramid are likely to be largely insulated from conditions in distant parts of the group (e.g.,
distant industries or geographies), we expect their behavior and performance to resemble those of similar
standalone rms.
Using a large and comprehensive dataset on the internal structure and nancial performance of about
40,000 groups in Western Europe covering the period 2002-2011, we provide several pieces of evidence
consistent with these ideas. First, we show that organizational distance is positively related to the level
of autonomy from headquarters that subsidiary managers report to enjoy, as measured by the World
Management Survey (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). Second, organizational distance is also related to
managerial practices that support decentralized decision-making at the subsidiary level, such as goal clarity
and e¤ective internal control mechanisms. Third, we examine the performance implications of greater
autonomy. We argue that, if subsidiaries located lower down the group pyramid are more autonomous
from headquarters than subsidiaries located higher up, then their response to changing industry conditions
should be more similar to that of matched standalone rms than the response of higher-level subsidiaries.
All these exercises provide strong support for our organizational distance hypothesis. The analysis also
identies several factors, including board interlocks, family ties and geographical proximity, that reduce
but do not eliminate the e¤ects of organizational distance.
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By contrast, we nd little support for the widespread view that tall pyramids are created to magnify
the control of large shareholders (Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis, 2000; Claessens, Djankov and Lang,
2000). Among the large groups in our sample, close to 70 percent are wholly- or almost wholly-owned by
the ultimate shareholder. In the Netherlands and Great Britain this percentage is as high as 90 percent.
Even in countries where pyramidingis widespread, such as Italy, more than 60% of all the large groups
are wholly-owned. Thus, at least in Western Europe and for large groups, the control-magnifyingview
appears to have limited validity.
Our work has implications for organization theory and corporate restructuring. In a signicant way,
the attentional perspective advocated in this paper turns the standard, control-magnifyingview of group
structure on its head. The control-magnifying view holds that tall structures are created to magnify the
voting control of large shareholders. Our attentional perspective emphasizes instead the greater auton-
omy of organizationally distant units. Thus, our attentional perspective suggests that tall pyramids
attenuate, not magnify, the control exerted by ultimate shareholders.
Our work also contributes to research on subsidiary autonomy. The international business literature
has engaged extensively with questions regarding the organization of the multinational corporation (MNC)
(Stopford and Wells, 1972; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989), the centralization of decision-making (Gupta and
Govindarajan, 1991) and the degree to which authority is delegated to foreign subsidiaries (Andersson,
Forsgren and Holm, 2002; Birkinshaw, 1997; Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995; Birkinshaw, Hood and
Jonsson, 1998; Mudambi and Navara, 2004). However, this literature has typically assumed, either
explicitly or implicitly, that foreign subsidiaries and headquarters interact directly, or at most through
the mediation of one or two layers (e.g. Stopford and Wells, 1972). We contribute to this literature by
exploring, for the rst time to our knowledge, the link between subsidiary autonomy and the pyramidal
structure of the intra-organizational network.
We do not claim that organizational distance has a causal e¤ect on subsidiary autonomy. While com-
munication and governance frictions suggest that such a causal relationship may exist, other factors such
as lack of headquartersinterest in a subsidiary may also be correlated with both organizational distance
and subsidiary autonomy. However, to the extent that organizational distance hinders headquarters
ability to meaningfully intervene in subsidiary matters, implications for corporate restructuring follow.
Consider the recent reorganizations at Airbus and Google. In 2016, Airbus merged its top entity, the
Airbus Group, with its most important subsidiary, Airbus Commercial Aircraft, thereby reducing the
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organizational distance between these units. A goal of the merger was to allow top management to focus
more on the market for jetliners which [was] booming, thanks largely to rising demand for air travel
from the expanding middle classes in emerging economies(Economist, 2016: 62-63). Conversely, in Oc-
tober 2015, Google partitioned its assets into several legally independent entities the Alphabet group. In
explaining the rationale behind this reorganization, founder Larry Page wrote: [f]undamentally, we be-
lieve this allows us more management scale, as we can run things independently that arent very related.2
The New York Times (2015) summarized Googles motives as follows: Google Goal in Restructuring as
Alphabet: Autonomy.
While Airbus and Googles motives for restructuring may be varied, these examples suggest that one
objective may be to ne-tune attention structures. Airbus restructured so that top management could
focus more on the commercial aircraft business. Google restructured (by creating a separate Alphabet
headquarters) so that subsidiary managers could enjoy greater autonomy. Structure, through communi-
cation or other channels, may have an inuence on attention, and this may be an important factor to
consider in corporate restructuring.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Organizational growth and divisionalization
Many organizations grow by leveraging their capabilities in related markets (Teece, 1980; Prahalad and
Bettis, 1986; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Anand and Singh, 1997). For instance, Du Pont started as a
gunpowder manufacturer and then expanded into dynamite, smokeless powder, dyestu¤s, synthetic bers,
plastics and countless other products. Google started as a search engine and then expanded into several
other internet-related services and products, as well as smart phone devices, driverless cars, healthcare
and so on.
Managing growth through diversication typically requires organizational change. Organizational
structure (or architecture) refers to the set of rules, processes and communication channels that allow the
organization to pursue its goals. A typical organizational response to growing complexity is hierarchical
decentralization. Simon (1947, 1962) and March and Simon (1958) note that complex social systems are
almost inevitably hierarchically organized, both to keep individual tasks manageable and to improve the
2From Larry Page, 2015, Google Announces Plans for New Operating Structure. Available at
https://abc.xyz/investor/news/releases/2015/0810.html
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resilience of the overall system. Because humans are bounded in their ability to process information,
organizations must create structures and procedures that channel information to the relevant decision-
makers and guide their problem-solving activities (Simon, 1947; Williamson, 1981; Ethiraj and Levinthal,
2004a; 2004b; Stan and Puranam, 2017). Hierarchy, division of labor, indoctrination and work practices
are examples of such structures and procedures.
Decentralization is often achieved through divisionalization. In a multidivisional structure, the organi-
zation is divided into several units responsible for specic products, customers, or regions. The units are
relatively autonomous, with divisional managers holding substantial decision-making authority within the
limits set by headquarters. An advantage of the multidivisional structure is that it allows for a division of
managerial attention, with headquarters focusing on strategic planning and oversight, and business units
focusing on more operational matters (Chandler, 1962).3
Both large diversied rms and corporate groups are often organized as multidivisional structures
(Chandler, 1962; Chang and Choi, 1988). Take for instance the Liebherr Group. The Liebherr Group
comprises more than 130 subsidiaries owned, directly or indirectly, by a central holding company, Liebherr-
International AG. The central holding company fullls directing, coordinating and monitoring functions.
The top management team, in particular, decides on nancial and investment policy. The subsidiaries
are divided into eleven product divisions (e.g., Aerospace and transportation systems, Components, and
Concrete technology), each headed by a divisional controlling company (e.g., Liebherr-Aerospace & Trans-
portation SAS, Liebherr-Component Technologies AG, and Liebherr-Mischtechnik GmbH). The product
divisions enjoy vast operational autonomy.4
Like multidivisional rms, corporate groups are often created to exploit economies of scale and scope.
Groups benet from redeploying nancial, managerial and technological resources across units, especially
when external markets function poorly (Le¤, 1978; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Belenzon and Berkovitz,
2010; Belenzon, Berkovitz and Rios, 2013). The fundamental di¤erence between corporate groups and
multidivisional rms is that, in corporate groups, units are organized as legally independent rms (i.e.,
3Subsequent work has claried that this division of managerial attention is a matter of degree. For instance, Freeland
(1996) demonstrates that involvement of business units in strategic decision-making at General Motors was much more
extensive than one may have expected, and actually produced better results than when strategic and operational decision-
making were more clearly separated. An extensive literature in international business emphasizes the role of subsidiary ini-
tiatives in multinational corporations (Birkinshaw, 1997; Birkinshaw et al., 1998) and highlights contingencies under which
subsidiaries are granted more or less autonomy from headquarters (Martinez and Jarillo, 1989; Gupta and Govindarajan,
1991).
4See the Liebherr Groups website at https://www.liebherr.com.
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subsidiaries), while in multidivisional rms, units are organized as (unincorporated) divisions. In general,
a rm can incorporate some of its units and keep others as divisions. The choice between setting up a
subsidiary and a division (i.e., between incorporating a unit or not) depends on many factors, including
tax, legal, informational and tradability considerations (Ayotte and Hansmann, 2012; Kandel, Kosenko,
Morck and Yafeh, 2015; Belenzon, Lee and Patacconi, 2018). Belenzon et al. (2018), for instance, show
that groups tend to set up more subsidiaries in countries where parent and sister companies are less likely
to be held liable for the losses of other group a¢ liates. New Deal reforms such as the Investment Company
Act of 1940 and the intercorporate dividend tax also a¤ected ownership structure in the US, leading to
the demise of many large corporate groups (Kandel et al., 2015).
Less fundamentally, corporate groups and multidivisional rms also di¤er because, while a rm wholly
owns all its divisions, a group may only partly own some of its subsidiaries. Indeed, it is often argued
that powerful owners create tall pyramids of partly-owned a¢ liates to control corporate assets worth
considerably more than their nominal ownership rights (Bebchuk et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2000).
This separation of ownership and control can give rise to important agency problems. The controlling
shareholders can, for instance, in collusion with management, transfer resources from subsidiaries where
they have low cash-ow rights (usually at the bottom of the pyramid) to subsidiaries where they have
higher cash-ow rights (usually, near the apex of the pyramid), to the detriment of minority shareholders
(Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer, 2000; Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005; Almeida
and Wolfenzon, 2006). Thus, tall pyramids may be created with a control-magnifyingor tunneling
intent.
2.2 The allocation of attention in groups
In this paper, we build on the premise that pyramidal groups originate from a historical process of growth
through diversication and examine how headquarters allocate their attention among their subsidiaries.
Following Bouquet, Morrison and Birkinshaw (2009: 110), we dene the attention of a group of man-
agers as a collective investment of time and e¤ort that is situated within an entire system of activities,
communications, and discussions.
Headquarters perform two fundamental functions in multidivisional organizations: entrepreneurial
and administrative (Chandler, 1962, 1991). The entrepreneurial function involves strategic planning
and resource allocation to govern the development, allocation and deployment of resources within the
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hierarchy (Bower, 1970; Collis, et al., 2007). The administrative function is concerned with monitoring
the performance of the operating divisions and checking on the use of the resources allocated. These
two functions are obviously intertwined: planning and resource allocation cannot properly be performed
without some knowledge and monitoring of internal operations. Ambos et al. (2010: 1103) similarly
highlight the monitoring function of headquarters, which comprises of formal control mechanisms and the
allocation of budgets and resourcesthrough, for instance, closer scrutiny of [the subsidiarys] strategic
plans, and [...] a higher frequency of visits.
Given the importance of the resource allocation task, headquarters attention can be conceptualized at
least partly as the extent to which headquarters are involved in the allocation of budgets and in scrutinizing
the subsidiariesstrategic plans. Signicant resource allocation and nancial review responsibilities are
located at the central or divisional headquarters level, arguably because these tasks require specialized
sta¤ that would be very costly to duplicate elsewhere within the group pyramid (Goold and Campbell,
2002). For instance, Chang and Choi (1988) document that, among the thirty largest Korean corporate
groups, most (twenty-four) possess a general corporate planning o¢ ce (or its equivalent) at the group
level, which can e¤ectively control a¢ liated rms.
We argue that the more headquarters are involved in allocating budgets and resources to a focal
subsidiary, the less autonomy the managers of the subsidiary will enjoy. When internal resource rede-
ployment is substantial, subsidiary managers cannot base their decisions solely on localconditions (their
own demand, borrowing capacity, etc.), but must instead also take intra-group transfers into account.
Autonomy, especially investment autonomy, is constrained, because headquarters can transfer funds from
one unit to another. By contrast, when internal resource redeployment is not important, headquarters
inuence is reduced. Subsidiaries will have to rely on their own resources, and their performance will
more closely resemble that of similar standalone rms.5
2.2.1 Organizational distance and subsidiary autonomy
As groups grow in size and complexity, headquarters will not be able (and sometimes will not wish) to
devote the same level of attention to all subsidiaries. They will have to allocate their attention selectively.
Building on the insight that organizational architecture structurally distributes managerial attention
5Of course, resource allocation is not the only form of headquarters attention. For instance, headquarters may help a
subsidiary evaluate potential alliance partners or potential targets for an acquisition (we thank an anonymous referee for
suggesting these examples). These forms of attention may or may not constrain the autonomy of the subsidiary. However,
our discussion will focus on the resource allocation role of headquarters.
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throughout the rm(Joseph and Ocasio, 2012: 635; Ocasio, 1997; Joseph and Wilson, 2018), we propose
that the structure of a group will often reect the allocation of attention within the group. Specically, we
introduce the concept of organizational distance the number of intermediate subsidiaries separating
a focal subsidiary from headquarters and argue that organizational distance is negatively related to
headquarters attention toward the focal subsidiary. Thus, as organizational distance between headquarters
and the subsidiary increases, the subsidiary will tend to enjoy more autonomy.
Subsidiary autonomy may increase with organizational distance for a number of reasons. First, or-
ganizational distance is likely to be inversely related to top managements interest and involvement in a
subsidiary. Units that are strategically important and generate or require signicant cash are likely to
be owned and monitored directly by central or divisional headquarters. Units that are less strategically
important may be located lower down the group pyramid.
Organizational distance may also a¤ect subsidiary autonomy because communication and governance
frictions hinder headquartersability to monitor and control organizationally distant subsidiaries. Com-
munication frictions are delays and distortions that arise when information is transmitted through com-
munication channels (Stopford and Wells, 1972; Dessein, 2002; Patacconi, 2009). The greater the distance
between two units, as measured by number of intermediaries a message has to go through, the greater the
chance that delays or distortions will occur. If these delays or distortions are severe enough, headquar-
ters may choose to relinquish control and grant subsidiaries more autonomy or subsidiaries may de facto
become more autonomous in their decision-making.
Governance frictions occur instead when subsidiary managers use their discretion or weaknesses in the
groups internal control systems to take actions that are suboptimal for the group as a whole. This occurs
when subsidiaries do not fully internalize the e¤ects of their actions on other group a¢ liates (Stopford and
Wells, 1972; Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek, 2008). For instance, subsidiary managers may be reluctant
to take actions that impose costs on their own units while delivering benets mostly to other units.
Governance frictions can be particularly severe when subsidiaries have minority shareholders (Bethel and
Liebeskind, 1998), because in most jurisdictions managers are required by law to protect the interests of
the shareholders of their own rm, not the interests of the controlling group. Moreover, unlike managers
of unincorporated units, subsidiary managers have formal CEO titles and clearly separated prots and
losses. As such, they may enjoy more autonomy, and may use this autonomy to protect the interests of
their rms.
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Because governance frictions can occur at each level of the group pyramid, headquartersloss of control
is likely to be particularly severe near the bottom of the pyramid. As Stopford and Wells (1972: 13)
emphasize: [governance] costs are likely to increase as the number of levels in the hierarchy increases:
the greater the number of levels, the greater is the possibility of suboptimal response. Note that, if
subsidiaries increasingly fail to internalize group-level externalities as one moves down the pyramid, we
should expect subsidiary behavior and performance to increasingly resemble those of standalone rms as
organizational distance increases.
In short, we suggest that, (i) because organizational distance is inversely related to top managements
interest and involvement in a subsidiary, and (ii) communication and governance frictions reduce the
e¤ectiveness of headquarters control, subsidiaries located near the bottom of the group pyramid will
enjoy greater autonomy from headquarters than subsidiaries located near the top.
Hypothesis 1. Subsidiary autonomy from headquarters increases with organizational distance.
2.2.2 Managerial practices supporting decentralization
If organizationally distant subsidiaries operate quasi-autonomously with little involvement from central
headquarters, then we would also expect these subsidiaries to exhibit managerial practices that support
decentralized decision-making.
In choosing to what extent to grant autonomy to a focal subsidiary, headquarters face a key trade-o¤.
On the one hand, if headquarters is more involved in a subsidiarys plans and operations, then it may not
be able to devote the same level of attention to other subsidiaries or tasks. For instance, Schoar (2002)
nds that acquisitions shift top managements attention to the acquired units, to the detriment of existing
divisions (a new toye¤ect). The overall e¤ect is negative because, although the productivity of the new
units increases, the productivity of the old units (which are much more numerous) declines.
On the other hand, if headquarters grants more autonomy to a subsidiary, agency problems may arise.
Subsidiary managers may engage in empire building (Harris and Raviv, 1996) or may avoid making
di¢ cult decisions, such as denying workers pay rises or shutting down old plants, preferring instead to
enjoy a quiet life(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). Even headquartersability to intervene ex post
may be compromised, because headquarters ability to fully understand the implications of subsidiary
decisions may be reduced (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Hoskisson, Hitt and Hill, 1993).
Before decision-making authority can be decentralized, therefore, headquarters must make sure that
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subsidiaries can operate autonomously in an e¤ective manner. Clear goals must be provided, and rigorous
internal controls must be established (Williamson, 1991; Hoskisson, Hitt and Hill, 1993). Thus, we expect
organizational distance, to the extent that it is correlated with greater autonomy, to be also correlated
with managerial practices that support decentralized decision-making, such as goal clarity and e¤ective
internal control mechanisms.
Hypothesis 2. Organizational distance is positively related to managerial practices that support decen-
tralized decision-making, such as goal clarity and e¤ective internal control mechanisms.
2.2.3 Resource allocation, organizational distance, and responsiveness to changing industry
conditions
If headquarters pay less attention to subsidiaries located lower down the pyramid and their management
exhibits more autonomous decision-making, then we should also expect their performance to more closely
resemble that of matched standalone rms. That is, the e¤ect of group membership, originating from
headquartersresource allocation role, should diminish as we move down the group pyramid.
Two important points must be emphasized here. The rst point concerns how headquarters allocate
resource in response to changing industry conditions. The literature has highlighted two di¤erent ways
in which internal capital markets may operate. These views may be labeled winner pickingand co-
insurance.
Winner picking theory holds that headquarters use their superior knowledge or information from
subsidiaries to allocate resources to the most promising units (Williamson, 1975; Stein, 1997; Ozbas,
2005). According to this view, multidivisional organizations exist precisely because their headquarters
can allocate resources more e¢ ciently than external capital markets. Winner picking theory suggests
that headquarters will transfer resources from units operating in declining industries to units operating
in growing industries. Thus, group membership will tend to magnify the impact of changing industry
conditions on subsidiary performance.
A di¤erent view is that headquarters support or prop uppoorly performing units. Risks are shared
among group a¢ liates by smoothing out income ows and by reallocating resources from cash-rich units
to poorly performing units (Chang and Hong, 2000; Ferris, Kim and Kitsabunnarat, 2003; Khanna and
Yafeh, 2005). Chang and Hong (2000), for instance, show that debt guarantees, equity investments and
internal trade are extensively used within Korean groups for cross-subsidization purposes. A key benet
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of co-insurance is that bankruptcy risk and subsidiaries cost of debt can be reduced (Lewellen, 1971;
Byun, Choi, Hwang and Kim, 2013). In addition, co-insurance may prevent the liquidation of promising
units hit by temporary adverse shocks (e.g., a recession). The downside of co-insurance is that funds
may be missallocated, especially if headquarters make decisions based on political rather than economic
considerations (Milgrom and Roberts, 1988; Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).
Co-insurance theory suggests that headquarters will allocate more resources to units operating in
declining industries, and fewer resources to units operating in growing industries, than external capital
markets would. Thus, group membership will tend to dampen (not magnify) the impact of changing
industry conditions on subsidiary performance.
The key point here is that, regardless of which e¤ect is predominant (winner picking or co-insurance),
if headquarters pay less attention to subsidiaries located lower down the pyramid, then the magnitude of
the group membership e¤ect will diminish with organizational distance.
A second important point is that headquarters may delegate resource allocation responsibilities for
organizationally distant subsidiaries to intermediate parents. Indeed, authority is often distributed in
complex organizations (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Goold and Campbell, 2002; Birkinshaw, Brauner-
hjelm, Holm and Terjesen, 2006; Piekkari, Nell and Ghauri, 2010). However, the functions of intermediate
parents are likely to be restricted to the specic industry or region over which they have purview (Stop-
ford and Wells, 1972). To the extent that the relevantparent and the focal subsidiary share common
characteristics, the impact of extraneous conditions on the focal subsidiary may be reduced, leaving it
largely insulated from conditions in distant parts of the group. In the case of the Liebherr Group, for in-
stance, lower level subsidiaries in the Domestic Appliances division headed by Liebherr-Hausgerate GmbH
will mostly be responsive to conditions prevailing in their industry, not to conditions prevailing in other
industries where the group operates (e.g., Components, Concrete technology, Cranes).
The arguments above suggest that the e¤ect of group membership, originating from headquarters
resource allocation role, should diminish as we move down the pyramid. Thus, within a group, the
performance of lower-level subsidiaries should more closely resemble that of matched standalone rms
than the performance of higher-level subsidiaries.
Hypothesis 3. As organizational distance increases, the performance of group a¢ liates in response to
changing industry conditions increasingly resembles that of matched standalone rms.
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2.2.4 Moderating factors
The previous hypothesis states that, as we move down the pyramid, performance di¤erences between group
a¢ liates and standalone rms are attenuated, because headquarters become less involved in allocating
resources to these organizationally distant subsidiaries. However, organizational distance is at best only a
crude proxy for headquarters attention. For instance, if headquarters and the subsidiary are in the same
industry, headquarters may devote more attention to the subsidiary and communication and governance
frictions may be lower, even if the subsidiary and headquarters are organizationally distant. Similarly, if
a subsidiary is managed by a member of the family that controls the group, communications between the
subsidiary and headquarters may remain good regardless of organizational distance. Governance frictions
may also be reduced, as family members are likely to take actions that are optimal for the group as a
whole, instead of just focusing on subsidiary performance.
These considerations suggest that subsidiary characteristics associated with greater closeness be-
tween headquarters and a focal subsidiary will tend to reduce the e¤ects of organizational distance on
subsidiary performance. Characteristics associated with greater closeness may include social ties among
managers (for instance due to family relationships or same ethnicity), board overlaps, and industrial or
geographical proximity.
Hypothesis 4. Subsidiary characteristics associated with greater closeness between headquarters and a
focal subsidiary reduce the e¤ects of organizational distance on subsidiary performance.
3 Data
This paper combines data from two main sources: (i) ownership and accounting data for corporate groups
from the Amadeus and Icarus databases compiled by Bureau Van Djik, and (ii)rm-level information on
managerial autonomy from the World Management Survey (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007).
We dene a corporate group as a confederation of two or more legally independent rms that are
controlled by the same ultimate owner (an individual, a family, or a widely-held corporation).6 Control
over a subsidiary can be exerted either directly or indirectly through a tall pyramidal structure. For
example, suppose that owner A controls rm B, which in turn controls rm C. In that case, we say that A
indirectly controls rm C. The pyramidal structure of a group consists of all the parent-subsidiary control
6We exclude from our sample rms where the ultimate owner is the state.
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chains that originate from the same ultimate owner. The procedure to construct pyramidal structures
using raw ownership data is discussed in the next subsection; further details are provided in the Appendix.
The analysis focuses on West European corporate groups. The source of rm-level accounting infor-
mation is the Company Register House in each of the countries in our sample. The key advantage of
this data is the large coverage of rms, especially private rms. Some of our groups have subsidiaries
located outside Western Europe. When we have data on these subsidiaries (e.g., subsidiaries in Eastern
Europe, or the United States), we include this information in our sample. To avoid including economically
insignicant groups, we drop groups that hold less than 10 million dollars in total assets, or only have
two or fewer subsidiaries. This leaves us with 53,944 groups in 15 West European countries. Of these
groups, 29% of the groups are British, 19% are French, 8% are German, 7% are Spanish and 5% are Ital-
ian. The remaining groups are from Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, Netherlands,
Switzerland, Portugal and Greece.
3.1 Constructing the groups pyramidal structure
We develop an algorithm to determine the structure of corporate groups based on the Amadeus and Icarus
ownership databases. The algorithm consists of two parts: (i) a control-chain generator that constructs
the control links among subsidiaries (the parent-subsidiary chains) and (ii) a name matching procedure
that groups together rms controlled by the same ultimate owner.
A shareholder is assumed to have direct control over a rm if it owns a su¢ ciently large equity stake
in that rm. We make the following assumptions regarding direct control. For private rms, we say that
shareholder A (an individual, a family, or a rm) controls rm B if A owns more than 50 percent of rm
B. For public rms, we assume control if the equity stake is larger than 20 percent. The lower threshold
for public rms reects the fact that ownership is typically much less concentrated in public rms than
in private rms. Thus, a lower equity stake is often su¢ cient to exert control in public rms.
The raw ownership database includes 843,390 ownership links that satisfy these control assumptions,
where 406,379 shareholders control 843,124 subsidiaries. The average percentage of ownership is 94.6 with
a median of 100 (77 percent of the ownership links involve wholly-owned subsidiaries). There are 2,484
public subsidiaries. For these subsidiaries, the average percentage of ownership is 53.6 with a median of
49.
Using these direct control links, the algorithm constructs parent-subsidiary control chains. Consider a
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situation where shareholder A controls rms B and C, and rm B controls rm D. The algorithm creates
the control chains A-B-D and A-C. Then the algorithm merges together all the control chains that refer
to the same ultimate owner (in this case, A). The ultimate owner can either be a widely-held corporation
or a family (where a family can be an individual shareholder). Aggregating individual shareholders
into families is not straightforward. We use information about surnames, and assume that if di¤erent
individuals share the same surname, they belong to the same family.7
An important denition is that of apex rm. The apex rms of a group are all the a¢ liates of the
group that have no corporate controlling shareholders (but may have family controlling shareholders). If
the ultimate owner of a group is a widely-held corporation, then there is only one apex rm: the widely-
held corporation. This is in fact the only group a¢ liate that has no corporate controlling shareholders
(and is obviously located at the top of the group). By contrast, if the groups ultimate owner is a family,
there can be multiple apex rms. These apex rms are located at the top of each of the parent-subsidiary
chains controlled by the family. For instance, suppose a family directly controls rms A1 and A2, A1
controls rm B1, and A2 controls rm B2. Then A1 and A2 are apex rms. By convention, all apex rms
are located at level 1. A¢ liates directly controlled by level 1 rms are located at level 2 (e.g., rms B1
and B2). A¢ liates directly controlled by level 2 rms are at level 3, as so on. We call all the a¢ liates
that are not apex rms subsidiaries. There is a simple relationship between organizational distance and
the ownership level of a subsidiary. Organizational distance is ownership level minus one.8
An important issue is how to deal with cross-holdings. Because we made restrictive control assump-
tions, cross-holdings are rare in our sample. Our algorithm ags cross-holdings, but only 0.5% of the
ownership chains in our sample include one or more cross-holdings. As there is no clear ordering of rms
in a cross-holding ownership chain, we eliminate these chains from our nal sample. Further details on
the algorithm are provided in the online appendix.
7The name matching process deals with three important issues. First, ultimate owner names are not standardized, i.e.,
the same name can be spelled di¤erently across subsidiaries. Second, common names may lead to over-grouping. Third,
for wealthy families, we frequently observe that di¤erent members control di¤erent rms at the top of a control chain.
Thus, we have to determine whether to group rms at the family level or at the individual level. We deal with these issues
as follows. First, we develop a name standardization procedure that harmonizes the di¤erent string patterns in the data.
Second, we search for publicly available information on each of our largest 500 corporate groups. When we cannot verify
from public sources (such as Forbes and The Economist) that a given family is indeed wealthy, we check for name com-
monality. We compute the frequency of the appearance of the name in the complete population of ultimate owner names.
In case this frequency is higher than the median frequency, we assume the common name problem and do not group ulti-
mate owners. In these cases, the ultimate owner of a group is the leading shareholder. Third, even when di¤erent family
members control di¤erent rms at the top of a control chain, we group chains at the family level.
8 In the econometric analysis, we aggregate all apex rms under the same ultimate owner. The regressions are within
groups, which means within ultimate owners, not apex rms.
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3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for corporate group subsidiaries that are included in the main econo-
metric analysis. The average 3-year growth rate of these subsidiaries is 41% with a median of 22%, a
10th percentile of -54% and a 90th percentile of 70% (our sample includes the 2008-2009 great recession,
a fact which explains why a considerable fraction of rms have contracted over time). Average rm sales
are $96 million (a median of $4.8 million) and average number of employees is 434 (a median of 36). The
average corporate group has 40 subsidiaries and controls close to $5 billion worth of sales.
Table 2 shows how subsidiary characteristics vary across ownership levels. Most subsidiary character-
istics remain stable across ownership levels: 3-year sales growth, sales, assets, number of employees, return
on assets, cash ow and direct equity stakes at the subsidiary level all remain similar across ownership
levels. The only exception is the percentage of publicly traded rms which drops with ownership level.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here]
Figures 1a and 1b present the distribution of group assets in our sample by corporate group depth.
Corporate group depth is dened as the maximum ownership level of the subsidiaries of a group. About
20% of assets are controlled by corporate groups with depth 2 or 3. The mode of the distribution is 6:
groups with depth 6 control 18.5% of the assets in our sample. About 55% of the assets in our sample
are controlled by groups with depth 6 or more: tall groups appear to be economically important. The
red dotted line represents assets controlled by family-owned groups as a percentage of the total assets
controlled within each level. Contrary to the view that tall groups are typically created by wealthy families
to magnify their voting power, this percentage declines with group depth. The ultimate owners of the
tallest groups tend to be widely-held corporations. This most likely reects the fact that depth and assets
are positively correlated, and family ownership tends to decline with group size (as measured by assets).
Figure 1b shows that tall groups are important in most countries in our sample. Interestingly, tall
groups are especially prominent in the UK and France (in the UK, 24% of assets are held by groups of
depth 8 and in France, 36% of assets are held by groups of depth 6). This fact is hard to reconcile with
the control-magnifying view. The control-magnifying view would suggest that the incentives to create tall
groups are greater in countries with weak minority shareholder protection, such as Italy or Spain, because
in those countries tunneling would be easier. By contrast, tall groups appear to be particularly prominent
in countries with strong minority shareholder protection and good corporate governance practices, such
16
as the UK.
[Insert Figures 1a and 1b here]
Next, we examine the extent to which economic activity within a corporate group is organized near
the bottom of the pyramid. For each group we calculate the share of assets at each ownership level over all
the assets held by the group and average these assets across groups with the same depth. For instance, in
Figure 2, the upper left gure plots the cumulative distribution of assets for corporate groups with depth
2. For these groups, 54% of assets are located at level 1 (the apex rm level) and the remaining 64% of
assets are located at level 2. The lower left gure plots the cumulative distribution of assets by levels for
corporate groups with depth 5. For these groups, only 13% of assets are located at level 1, 55% of assets
are located at level 3 and above, and 23% of assets are located at levels 4 and 5. Lastly, the bottom right
gure plots the distribution of assets by level for corporate groups with depth 7. For these groups, 68%
of assets are located at levels 3 and above, and 33% of assets are located at levels 4 and above. Taken
together these plots indicate that a signicant share of group assets is located in lower-level subsidiaries,
suggesting that a large share of the groupseconomic activity occurs near the bottom of the pyramid.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
4 Pyramidal structure and minority owners
The pattern that emerges from Figures 1 and 2 is that tall pyramids are economically important and
that, within corporate groups, a signicant portion of economic activity takes places near the bottom of
the pyramid. But why are these tall pyramids created? A popular view, which we label the control-
magnifyingview, holds that tall pyramids are created by large shareholders to extend their control over
vast empireswhile committing only limited resources. According to this view, pyramiding is a legal
device that helps separate ownership and control. This separation becomes more and more extreme as
one moves down the pyramid.
In this section, we examine the relevance of the control-magnifying view in our sample of large Western
European groups. We focus on groups with annual sales of at least $100 million, where the results are
more striking. We nd very little support for the view that tall pyramids are created to magnify the
control of large shareholders.
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Figure 3 presents the distribution of wholly-owned groups by country and ultimate owner type. A
group is classied as wholly-owned (or almost wholly-owned) if the ultimate owner of the group owns on
average at least 95% of the group a¢ liatesequity. Western European groups are often wholly-owned by
their ultimate owners. As Figure 3a shows, nearly 70 percent of corporate groups in the large group sample
are wholly-owned. In the Netherlands and Great Britain, this percentage is as high as 90 percent. Even
in countries where pyramidingis widespread, such as Italy, more than 60% of groups are wholly-owned.
Figures 3b distinguish between family-owned and widely-held groups. A large proportion of groups in
each subsample remains wholly-owned, although results are weaker for family-owned groups.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Finally, we examine whether the ownership stake of the ultimate owner decreases as we move down
the pyramid. Supporting our previous ndings of very high ownership concentration in most large groups,
we do not observe a declining ownership stake pattern in our data. As Figure 4a shows, for ownership
level 2, average equity held by the ultimate owner is 95%, and 86% of these ownership links capture
wholly-owned relationships. The percentage of equity remains quite stable even when we reach level 6
and beyond. Figure 4b presents the same pattern separately for each of the main countries in our sample.
While there is some variation across countries, the main ndings are robust. In every country, the majority
of ownership links denote full ownership (100 percent equity stake) and the average share of equity stakes
owned by the ultimate owner remains quite stable as we move down the pyramid.
[Insert Figures 4a and 4b here]
The conclusion we draw from Figures 3 and 4 is that, at least for large groups in several Western
European countries, the control-magnifying view of corporate group structure has limited validity.
Enabling the separation of ownership and control does not appear to be a major reason for the creation
of tall corporate groups in this sample.
5 Pyramidal structure and subsidiary autonomy
In Section 2, we argued that the structure of a group often reects the allocation of managerial attention
within the group. The greater the organizational distance of a focal subsidiary from headquarters, the
less attention headquarters will devote to that subsidiary, and hence the greater the level of autonomy
18
that the subsidiary will enjoy. In this section, we present several pieces of evidence consistent with this
idea.
5.1 Evidence from the World Management Survey
The rst piece of evidence relies on survey data. The World Management Survey (WMS) (Bloom and
Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2012) provides detailed rm-level information on the
perceived level of autonomy of subsidiary managers from central headquarters (CHQ). Plant managers,
often operating in legally independent subsidiaries, were asked questions about their perceived level of
autonomy in investment, hiring, production, and marketing decisions from CHQ. We merge WMS data
with our data on pyramidal structure to examine whether the perceived level of autonomy of a focal
subsidiary manager is positively associated with organizational distance, as measured by the subsidiarys
ownership level.
The WMS sample includes 2,185 European rms (42% from Great Britain, 17% from Germany, 17%
from France, 10% from Italy, 9% from Italy and the remaining from Northern Ireland). We match 71% of
the rms in WMS to our corporate group sample. Based on our control assumptions, 29% of the WMS
rms are standalone rms, which we exclude from the analysis. The average WMS subsidiary is located
at level 3.2 with a median of 3.
We examine whether the organizational distance between a subsidiary and the apex rm (as measured
by the subsidiarys ownership level) is positively associated with subsidiary autonomy (Hypothesis 1). To
measure subsidiary autonomy, we use several questions from theWMS: (i) the number of hierarchical layers
that separate a subsidiary manager from central headquarters, which we assume is located in the apex rm
(WMS label: level2ceo); (ii) the percentage of headquarters managers that are on subsidiary site (WMS
label: onsite); and (iii) four dimensions of business unit autonomy: (a) hiring autonomy (WMS label:
central4), (b) investment autonomy (WMS label: lcentral5), (c) sales and marketing autonomy (WMS
label: central6), and (d) new product introduction autonomy (WMS label: central7). Higher scores for
questions (i) and (iii), and lower scores for question (ii), imply greater autonomy for the subsidiary.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, Table 3 shows a positive correlation between organizational distance
and survey measures of subsidiary autonomy. In all specications, we control for equity stakes held by
the ultimate owner, employment, age, total number of subsidiaries in the group, and complete sets of
country and two-digit SIC code xed-e¤ects.
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Column 1 shows a strong positive relationship between ownership level and the survey measure of the
number of hierarchical layers that separate the subsidiary manager from CHQ. Column 2 examines the
relationship between the percentage of rms that report that headquarters managers are on subsidiary
site and ownership level, and shows a strong negative correlation between these two measures. Based on
the estimate from Column 1, moving from the apex rm (level 1) to a level 3 subsidiary is associated with
an increase of 3.6 reported hierarchy levels, the same as the sample average hierarchy levels. Based on
the estimate from Column 2, moving from the apex rm (level 1) to a level 3 subsidiary is associated with
a decrease of 0.21 in the share of rms that report CHQ managers are on site (30% of sample average
value).
Column 3 examines the relationship between ownership level and the subsidiarys aggregate response to
the autonomy questions (WMS label: central). There is a positive and statistically signicant relationship
between subsidiary autonomy and ownership level. Moving from the apex rm to a level 3 subsidiary
yields a 50% increase in the autonomy score, relative to the average sample response. Columns 4-7 explore
in more detail which functions subsidiaries located lower down in the ownership chain are granted greater
autonomy, relative to subsidiaries closer to CHQ. We nd that the positive relationship between ownership
level and autonomy is driven by investment autonomy. Moving from the apex rm to a level 3 subsidiary
is associated with 48% increase in the largest capital investment that subsidiaries can make without prior
authorization from CHQ (an additional $26 million).
[Insert Table 3 here]
5.2 Managerial practices supporting decentralization
If headquarters are not heavily involved in scrutinizing the plans of organizationally distant subsidiaries,
then we would also expect these subsidiaries to exhibit managerial practices that support decentralized
decision-making (Hypothesis 2). Table 4 tests this idea using several additional questions from the World
Management Survey (WMS).
Columns 1 and 2 focus on goal setting. We argue that, to support decentralized decision-making, goals
must be clearly specied and progress toward their achievement must be measured. Column 1 shows that
the extent to which goals are broken down to individual workers in a subsidiary is positively related to
organizational distance from headquarters. Column 2 shows that goals are more clearly specied and
measurable in lower-level subsidiaries. This supports the view that greater autonomy in organizationally
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distant subsidiaries is at least partly supported by clear goals and targets whose achievement can be
measured.
Columns 3-6 focus on the relationship between internal performance reviews and organizational dis-
tance. We argue that, if headquarters are not heavily involved in monitoring organizationally distant
subsidiaries, then these subsidiaries should possess e¤ective internal control mechanisms. Consistent with
this view, Column 3 shows that the extent to which measurable performance indicators are used in a
subsidiary is positively related to organizational distance from headquarters. Also, performance reviews
are more frequent and internal performance reviews are better structured and more consequential in
organizationally distant subsidiaries (Columns 4 to 6).
Taken together, our results suggest that autonomy in organizationally distant subsidiaries is at least
partly supported by clearly specied goals and e¤ective internal control mechanisms.
[Insert Table 4 here]
5.3 Responsiveness to industry growth
Our next piece of evidence focuses on the performance implications of greater autonomy. We compare the
e¤ect of changing industry conditions on the performance of subsidiaries located at di¤erent levels in the
group pyramid. The idea is that, if subsidiaries located lower down the pyramid are more autonomous
from central headquarters than subsidiaries located higher up, then their response to changing industry
conditions should be more similar to that of matched standalones than the response of subsidiaries located
higher up (Hypothesis 3).
We focus on the relationship between the realized growth rate of a subsidiary and the aggregate
industry growth rate. For each a¢ liate in our sample we match a comparable standalone rm. The
matching is based on exact match on three-digit SIC industry code, year of incorporation and country
and a continuous match on sales. Our dependent variable is the di¤erence in 3-year growth rate between
an a¢ liated rm and its standalone control.
Our econometric specication is as follows:
(Salesit Salesmt) = 1Leveli+2LeveliSalesjt+3Salesjt+X 0it5+g+'j+cc+ t+it .
(Salesit   Salesmt) is the di¤erence in 3-year sales growth rates between a focal a¢ liate i and its
standalone control m. Leveli is is ownership level in the group (the apex rm is at level one). Salesjt
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is a 3-year average sales growth rate for industry j (where the focal rm and the matched standalone
operate). Xit is a vector of a¢ liate controls.  is a corporate group xed e¤ect (that is, all estimations
are within-corporate groups), 'j is a three-digit industry xed e¤ect,  t is year e¤ects and it is an iid
error term.
The coe¢ cients of interest are 2 and 3. The winner picking view suggests that, because headquarters
transfer resources from declining industries to growing industries, group membership magnies the impact
of changing industry conditions on subsidiary performance. This implies b3 > 0. The co-insurance view,
by contrast, suggests that headquarters tend to insulate subsidiaries from adverse industry conditions.
The e¤ect of group membership is therefore to reduce the impact of changing industry conditions on
subsidiary performance. This implies b3 < 0. Regardless of which e¤ect prevails, Hypothesis 3 suggests
that the magnitude of the group membership e¤ect diminishes with organizational distance. Thus, ifb3 > 0, then b2 < 0. If b3 < 0, then b2 > 0.
Table 5 presents the estimation results. We start by not controlling for matched standalone rms
(Column 1). As expected, we nd that changes in sales by group a¢ liates are strongly and positively
correlated to changes in sales at the industry level. Column 2 includes matched standalone rms
the dependent variable is now the di¤erence in sales growth rates between an a¢ liate and its matched
standalone rm. The coe¢ cient estimate on the linear term of industry growth (b3) switches sign.
Consistent with the co-insurance view, we nd that b3 < 0, indicating that standalone rms are, on
average, more responsive to own industry conditions than group a¢ liates. Consistent with Hypothesis 3,
this di¤erential responsiveness depends on where the subsidiary is located in the ownership chain. The
estimated interaction coe¢ cient between ownership level and industry sales, b2 , is positive
and statistically signicant, indicating that the relative responsiveness to external industry conditions
increases with ownership level. Based on the estimates from Column 2, for subsidiaries located at level
2 (directly owned by the apex rm), a 10% increase in industry sales is associated with a 1.12% lower
growth, relative to a matched standalone (10%  ( 0:244 + 0:066  2)). This di¤erential response to
industry growth completely disappears for a¢ liates that are located at ownership level 4.
Columns 3 controls for joint group-industry xed-e¤ects to mitigate concerns that subsidiary respon-
siveness to external economic conditions is a¤ected by group-industry specic e¤ects. The results remain
robust. Columns 4-6 control for equity stakes by the groups ultimate owner to mitigate the concern that
the ownership level estimates are driven by the separation between ownership and control. The coe¢ cient
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estimate on the interaction between equity stakes by the ultimate owner and industry sales growth is
negative and signicant, indicating that higher equity stake by the ultimate owner is associated with
greater insulation of the subsidiary from external economic conditions. This is consistent with the idea
that ultimate owners pay more attention to (and hence insulate more) units that are wholly-owned. The
coe¢ cient estimate on the interaction between ownership level and industry sales remains essentially un-
changed. Column 5 restricts the sample to wholly-owned subsidiaries and Column 6 restricts the sample
to partly-owned subsidiaries. Our results of lower insulation of a¢ liates from external conditions at higher
ownership levels hold only for the subsample of wholly-owned a¢ liates. Columns 7-9 distinguish between
di¤erent types of ultimate owners: family (Column 7), widely-held industrial companies (Column 8) and
widely-held nancial institutions (Column 9). Our result of lower insulation at higher ownership levels is
driven by groups whose ultimate owners are widely-held; no such e¤ect is found for family groups. This
is consistent with the results in the next subsection indicating that family ties can mitigate the e¤ects of
organizational distance. Column 10 includes a dummy variable for the 2008-2009 great recession years
to examine whether the insulation of a¢ liates from external conditions varies by good and bad times.
Interestingly, we nd that the insulation of higher level a¢ liates is stronger in recession years.9
[Insert Table 5 here]
5.3.1 Moderating factors
While organizational distance may weaken the link between headquarters and a focal subsidiary, leading
to lower insulation of the subsidiary from external economic conditions, other factors may counteract this
e¤ect. For instance, if headquarters and a subsidiary are in the same industry, headquarters may devote
more attention to the subsidiary and communication frictions may be lower, even if the subsidiary and
headquarters are organizationally distant. Thus, we expect that subsidiary characteristics associated with
9Tax avoidance may help explain why some subsidiaries and some pyramids are created; however, it cannot easily ex-
plain our results on autonomy. For instance, how can tax avoidance explain why subsidiaries are more similar to stand-
alone rms in terms of sales growth when organizational distance is high? Presumably groups use tax avoidance to shift
paper prots from one jurisdiction to another, not to inuence rm growth or any other realvariable (Tørsløv, Wier and
Zucman, 2018). Most importantly, tax avoidance considerations should not matter for domestic (same-country) groups.
In unreported regressions, we re-estimated our main specications for groups with no foreign subsidiaries. We obtain sim-
ilar qualitative results for these domestic groups. For example, estimating Column 2 in Table 5 only for domestic groups
(282,338 observations) yields a coe¢ cient estimate on the interaction between ownership level and changes in industry
sales of 0.050 (a standard error of 0.013), which is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level. For the specications
from Column 3 in Table 5, the estimate on the interaction term between ownership level and changes in industry sales is
0.049 (a standard error of 0.013), which is also statistically signicant at the 1 percent level. These results suggest that
tax avoidance is not a plausible explanation for the greater levels of autonomy that we observe near the bottom of group
pyramids.
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greater closeness between headquarters and the focal subsidiary will mitigate the e¤ects of organizational
distance (Hypothesis 4).
We construct six measures of closeness between headquarters and a focal subsidiary. Our closeness
measures are: (i) same industry, (ii) family managers, (iii) same ethnicity, (iv) board interlocks, (v) overlap
a¢ liate name, and (vi) same geographical region. Same industry is a dummy variable that receives the
value of one for a¢ liates that are in the same 3-digit SIC code as the apex rms, and zero for all the other
a¢ liates. Family managers is a dummy variable that receives the value of one for a¢ liates with managers
that have the same last name as at least one shareholder that owns at least 5% of the total group assets,
and zero for all the other a¢ liates. Same ethnicity is a dummy variable that receives the value of one for
a¢ liates with a managers ethnicity that is the same as the ethnicity of at least one manager of the apex
rm, and zero for all the other a¢ liates.10 Board interlocks is a dummy variable that receives the value of
one for a¢ liates with at least one board member who is also a board member of the apex rm, and zero
for all the other a¢ liates. Overlap a¢ liate name is a dummy variable that receives the value of one for
a¢ liates with a common name as the apex rm, and zero for all the other a¢ liates. Same geographical
region is a dummy variable that receives the value of one for a¢ liates that are in the same 4-digit NUTS
code as the apex rm, and zero for all the other a¢ liates.
Table 6 tests the idea that these closeness measures mitigate the e¤ects of organizational distance.
We look at how a¢ liatesresponsiveness to industry growth (relative to matched standalone rms) varies
with ownership level and each of the closeness measures. In line with Table 5, Table 6 shows that, while
subsidiaries are less a¤ected by industry growth than standalone rms, the higher their ownership level,
the smaller such insulation is. The key new nding is that each of our closeness measures signicantly
reduces the insulation e¤ect associated with higher ownership level. For instance, in Column 1, the
reduction in insulation associated with higher ownership level is cut by about half if the subsidiary and
headquarters operate in the same industry. Columns 2-6 provide similar results for the other closeness
measures. Thus, overall our results provide a consistent picture. Industry and geographical proximity, as
well as social relations between the group owners and subsidiary managers (as captured by family and
ethnic ties), reduce the e¤ects of organizational distance. The same is true for board interlocks and name
10To determine managers ethnicity we use information about each managers last name to discern the ethnic homogene-
ity of the top managers for each group. We quantify social diversity using the services of OriginsInfo (a subsidiary of Ex-
perian) to analyze the names of the roughly one million top managers in our dataset. OriginsInfo relies on a database that
can identify the likely cultural origin of over 1,800,000 family names and 700,000 personal names. With this, we attach a
unique ethnic background to each manager based on her last name.
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similarity. Thus, our evidence provides strong support for Hypothesis 4.
[Insert Table 6 here]
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
One of the most important functions of headquarters in multidivisional organizations is to allocate re-
sources. However, because headquartersability to attend to information is limited, the same level of
attention cannot be devoted to all units. Attention must be allocated selectively, focusing on the most
important or strategic units.
Building on the attention-based view of the rm, we argue that organizational distance the number
of intermediate subsidiaries separating a focal subsidiary from headquarters is a useful proxy for how
headquarters allocate their attention. The lower the organizational distance between a focal subsidiary and
headquarters, the more headquarters will be involved in scrutinizing the subsidiarys plans and in providing
the means necessary to accomplish these plans. By contrast, organizationally distant subsidiaries will
largely operate autonomously, with little interference from the center. As a result, their performance will
closely resemble that of similar standalone rms in their industry and geography.11
Using a large sample of corporate groups from 15 Western European countries, we provide three
pieces of evidence consistent with these ideas. First, organizational distance is positively related to
the perceived level of autonomy that subsidiary managers enjoy, as measured by the World Management
Survey (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). Second, subsidiaries are more likely to exhibit managerial practices
that support autonomy and decentralized decision-making as organizational distance increases. Third,
di¤erences in responsiveness to changing industry conditions between subsidiaries and matched standalone
rms decline with organizational distance. It is obviously reassuring that organizational distance and
independent survey measures of subsidiary autonomy are strongly positively correlated. What is more,
the WMS measures that turn out to be the most signicant in our analysis Share HQ managers on
siteand investment autonomy are also those that arguably better capture formal resource allocation
mechanisms such as closer scrutiny of [the subsidiarys] strategic plans, and [...] a higher frequency of
11We stress that, although lower-level subsidiaries may be largely insulated from headquartersresource allocation in-
uence, other types of coordination among subsidiaries especially in functions such as manufacturing and marketing
may still be present. For instance, in Unilevers geographically decentralized structure, cross-regional coordination within
the Hungary, Croatia and Slovenias sub-region is delegated to Unilever Hungary (Alfordi, Clegg and McGaughey, 2012).
Coordination by intermediate parents can create economies of scale and scope, thus justifying the existence of corporate
group structures even when headquarters can only devote very limited attention to lower-level subsidiaries.
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visits, as emphasized by Ambos et al. (2010: 1103).
At a broad level, our evidence supports a key tenet of the attention-based view that organizational
architecture structurally distributes managerial attention throughout the rm, with managers within
various subunits and organizational levels focusing attention on di¤erent aspects of the rms agenda
(Joseph and Ocasio, 2012: 635). We nd that organizational architecture and headquartersallocation of
attention are tightly coupled, with headquarters exerting a more important resource allocation role when
subsidiaries are organizationally close.
The attentional perspective advanced in this paper di¤ers signicantly from other important perspec-
tives on group structure in the literature. Corporate nance scholars hold that tall pyramidal structures
are often created to magnify the voting power of large shareholders, possibly with an expropriative intent
(Bebchuk et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2000). In the context of large groups in Western Europe, we nd
little support for this view. The majority of large groups in our sample are wholly or almost wholly owned,
suggesting that extending the voting power of dominant shareholders through stock pyramids cannot be
the main reason for the existence of these pyramidal structures. Rather than magnifying the control
of dominant shareholders, tall pyramids appear to structurally distribute and attenuate headquarters
attention.
Other scholars tend to ignore the legal structure of multinational groups, as reected by parent-
subsidiary chains. Stopford and Wells (1972: 10), for instance, argue that the legal structure [of multi-
national enterprises] can be ignored [...] [T]he legal structure is designed, in accordance with government
regulations, for cash-ow and tax purposes; it seldom reects the way in which the enterprise is managed.
While we agree that legal structure is often designed in accordance with government regulations, or for
tax or limited liability purposes, we also show that organizational structure is systematically related to
how headquarters attention is allocated. This information is likely to be valuable, not least because data
on parent-subsidiary chains is typically much more readily available than data on managerial attention
patterns.
Our results have implications for debates about the nature and functions of corporate groups in so-
ciety, as well as the theory of the rm more generally. In reviewing the growing literature on corporate
groups, Khanna and Yafeh (2007) warn that the link between corporate groups and the expropriation of
minority shareholders is becoming an unquestioned axiom, which they believe is unwarranted. Khanna
and Yafeh urge researchers to document how many groups around the world are actually vertically con-
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trolled pyramids and where they are located. Our work is a step in that direction. In many cases, we
argue, tall pyramids are not an indicator of expropriative intent, but of decentralized decision-making. A
Chandlerianperspective, where groups grow over time to exploit diversication opportunities and select
legal forms tting their institutional context, is in our view a more plausible explanation for the existence
of corporate groups in many contexts. This does not mean that expropriation of minority shareholders is
not sometimes an important concern, especially in developing countries where investor protection is weak.
Our study provides evidence on the nature of resource allocation in groups. We show that, at least
in Western Europe and in a period characterized by great turbulence (the nancial crisis of 2008-2009
and its aftermath), headquarters are more likely to support or prop upa¢ liates in declining segments
than to support a¢ liates in growing segments. Our ndings suggest that group a¢ liates will perform
comparatively better when conditions in their industry are bad (because they receive support from the
group) and perform comparatively worse when conditions in their industry are good (because they provide
support to other a¢ liates).
It is not clear a priori whether co-insurance is a source of competitive advantage or disadvantage at the
group level. Some scholars view co-insurance in a negative way, as the outcome of inuence activities or
misguided concerns for equality (a form of corporate socialism). However, co-insurance can also reduce
the risk of bankruptcy and facilitate access to credit (Lewellen, 1971; Byun et al., 2013). Examining
the performance implications of co-insurance at the group level is a very interesting avenue for future
research.
We stress again that, while we document a robust correlation between organizational distance and
subsidiary autonomy, this does not imply that a causal relationship exist. Communication and governance
frictions may hinder headquarterscontrol, especially when subsidiaries are organizationally distant, but
factors such as lack of headquarters interest may be correlated both with organizational distance and
subsidiary autonomy. For instance, headquarters may only directly acquire subsidiaries that they deem
strategically important (and to which they intend to devote a lot of attention), while delegating the
acquisition of less strategic subsidiaries to lower-level parents. Of course, both mechanisms may be at
work, with communication and governance frictions hindering headquarterscontrol, and headquarters,
because of this, choosing to directly own only the most important or strategic units.
Another limitation of the paper is that we can only observe incorporated subsidiaries. It would be
very interesting to compare how the allocation of attention and decision making authority is distributed
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between the internal units of a single rm, as opposed to the incorporated subsidiaries of a group. A key
hypothesis to be tested is that the legal incorporation of subsidiaries grants additional autonomy to units
and hence is associated with lower vertical interaction.
To conclude, this paper provides a detailed analysis of the internal structure of an important economic
organization, the corporate group. By emphasizing organizational architecture as a way to selectively dis-
tribute managerial attention, this paper provides a novel perspective on group structure that signicantly
deviates from existing perspectives focusing on magnication of control. In so doing, it develops a more
positive view of tall pyramidal structures and demonstrates the usefulness of a theoretically plural ap-
proach to organization design.
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Share Owned Share Family-Owned
Note: This figure presents the distribution of group assets in our sample by corporate group depth. Corporate group depth is  defined as the maximum ownership level of 
the subsidiaries of a group. The bars represent the share of assets controlled by groups in Europe with different maximum ownership levels. The red dotted line represents 
assets controlled by family-owned corporate groups as a percentage of the total assets controlled within each level. Level 10 aggregates maximum levels of 10 and greater.






















2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Maximum Levels in Corporate Groups
British Corporate Groups 























2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Maximum Levels in Corporate Groups
German Corporate Groups

























2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Maximum Levels in Corporate Groups
French Corporate Groups





















2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Maximum Levels in Corporate Groups
Italian Corporate Groups





















2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Maximum Levels in Corporate Groups
Spanish Corporate Groups 



















2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Maximum Levels in Corporate Groups
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Note: The bars represent the share of assets owned by groups in individual European countries with different maximum corporate ownership levels. The red dotted line represents assets 
controlled by family-owned corporate groups as a percent of the total assets controlled within each level (level 10 aggregates maximum levels of 10 and greater).
Figure 2. Cumulative Distribution of Assets Within Groups of Same Depth by Ownership Level
Note: The figures present the cumulative distribution of assets across levels among groups with the same group depth, GD.  For example, for corporate groups with three levels (GD = 3), 
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Figure 3. Wholly-Owned Groups by Country and Ultimate Owner Type
Note: Figure 3 presents the distribution of wholly-owned groups by country (Figure 3a) and for family-owned vs. widely-held groups (Figure 3b). A corporate group is classified as 
wholly-owned if the ultimate owner of the group owns on average at least 95% of the group affiliates’ equity. In Figure 3b, the % values are the percentage of family-held groups in each 
country. Only groups that generate at least $100m in annual sales are included in this sample. 
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Subsidiary ownership level and equity stakes by country
Equity owned by ultimate owner Share full ownership
Note: This figure presents the share of equity held by the corporate group’s ultimate owner by ownership level. The bars plot the share of equity and the dashed 
line plots the share of ownership links that are wholly-owned (100%). For example, for affiliates of ownership level 2 (one level below the apex firm), the apex 
firm holds on average 95% of equity and 86% of equity ties are wholly-owned.
Figure 4a. Subsidiary ownership level and ultimate owner equity stakes.
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Italian Corporate Groups
Equity owned by ultimate owner
Variable # firms Mean Std. Dev. 10st 50th 90th
3-year Sales Growth 707,159 0.409 0.855 -0.538 0.218 0.697
Sales t-3  ('000, $) 719,591 96,455 1,541,163 217 4,860 87,833
Number of Employees 460,489 434 5,497 3 36 415
Total Assets  ('000, $) 719,591 222,686 6,972,096 484 5,907 106,355
Return on Assets (EBIT/Assets) 719,591 0.032 0.264 -0.088 0.030 0.188
Year of Incorporation 645,192 1986 27.1 1963 1991 2002
Number of Group Affiliates 719,591 40.2 114.8 3 7 85
Group Sales ('000, $) 719,591 4,932,688 26,248,940 2,811 70,092 4,362,589





















1 st  (Apex) 0.467 90,944 418,514 337 0.044 9,128 4.46 -
2 nd 0.396 45,445 124,977 122 0.027 3,678 0.61 0.95 0.86
3 rd 0.393 67,473 77,267 167 0.025 5,663 0.29 0.92 0.82
4 th 0.416 100,324 103,677 224 0.030 8,579 0.26 0.91 0.80
5 th 0.405 95,537 121,514 261 0.023 8,644 0.07 0.90 0.79
6 th  and above 0.377 79,748 135,070 261 0.046 8,251 0.00 0.91 0.83
Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries 0.414 111,921 235,784 365 0.031 11,845 - - -
Partly-Owned Subsidiaries 0.390 79,038 92,429 226 0.025 7,075 0.74 - 0.615
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Distribution
Notes:  Financial information covers the period 2006-2010. Ownership is based on 2006 data.
Table 2. Subsidiary Characteristics by Ownership Level
Notes:  Financial information covers the period 2006-2010. Ownership is based on 2006 data.




















ln(Ownership Level) 0.503 -0.152 0.203 0.248 0.763 0.242 0.092
(0.124) (0.043) (0.105) (0.137) (0.205) (0.153) (0.147)
Equity Stakes by Ultimate Owner 0.411 -0.083 0.108 0.208 0.557 -0.089 0.070
(0.217) (0.077) (0.168) (0.220) (0.465) (0.238) (0.221)
ln(Firm Employees) 0.305 -0.072 0.006 0.091 0.142 0.011 -0.009
(0.035) (0.013) (0.029) (0.036) (0.060) (0.041) (0.038)
Firm Age 0.006 0.019 -0.118 -0.225 0.023 -0.042 -0.003
(0.072) (0.026) (0.061) (0.084) (0.134) (0.093) (0.085)
ln(Number of Group Affiliates) 0.049 -0.030 -0.004 -0.079 0.042 0.042 0.029
(0.026) (0.009) (0.023) (0.029) (0.050) (0.033) (0.031)
Country Dummies (7) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-digit Industry Dummies (19) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Avg. Survey Value: 3.56 0.70 2.72 3.21 54,821 2.31 2.49
Avg. Ownership Level: 3.20 3.21 3.21 3.21 3.21 3.21 3.21
Std. Ownership Level: 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.14 3.19 3.19
Observations 1,173 1,361 1,305 1,415 985 1,189 1,152
R-squared 0.150 0.173 0.038 0.048 0.107 0.051 0.032
Notes: This table examines the relationship between the perceived autonomy of subsidiary managers, as measured by the World Management 
Survey (WMS), and organizational distance. Hierarchy levels to CEO  (Column 1) is the number of hierarchical levels that separate a subsidiary 
manager from headquarters (WMS label: level2ceo, "Number of levels in the firms between the shopfloor and the CEO "). Share HQ managers 
on site  (Column 2) is the percentage of headquarters managers that are at the subsidiary site (WMS label: onsite, "Is CHQ on the site being 
interviewed ?"). Column 3 is the aggregate survey response to the autonomy questions, with higher values indicating greater subsidiary 
autonomy (WMS label: central). The disaggregated autonomy questions are presented in Columns 5-7, as follows. Column 4: "To hire a full-
time permanent shop floor worker what agreement would your plant need from CHQ?". Column 5: What is the largest capital investment your 
plant could make without prior authorization from CHQ?" Column 6: "How much of sales and marketing is carried out at the plant level (rather 
than at the CHQ)?" Column 7: "Where are decisions taken on new product introductions - at the plant, at the CHQ or both?" Robust standard 
errors in parentheses.
Table 3. Perceived Autonomy by Subsidiary Managers and Ownership Level
Table 4. Managerial Practices Supporting Decentralization and Ownership Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WMS survey measure:

















ln(Ownership Level) 0.201 0.111 0.252 0.197 0.183 0.115
(0.055) (0.037) (0.051) (0.048) (0.047) (0.049)
ln(Firm Employees) 0.163 0.128 0.167 0.164 0.174 0.137
(0.025) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022)
Firm age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
ln(Number of group affiliates) 0.029 0.013 0.017 0.022 0.032 0.054
(0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.017)
Country Dummies (5) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-digit industry dummies (19) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,429 2,427 2,433 2,431 2,381 2,426
R-squared 0.117 0.103 0.164 0.163 0.142 0.124
B. Performance ReviewA. Goal Setting
Notes: This table examines the relationship between managerial practices supporting decentralization and organizational distance. Columns 1-
2 relate to goal setting and columns 3-6 relate to performance review. The questions from the World Management Survey (WMS) are as 
follows: Column 1: "What is the motivation behind your goals and how are they cascaded down to the individual workers?" (WMS label: 
perf7). Column 2: "If your staff were asked about individual targets, what would they say?" (WMS label: perf10). Column 3: "What kind of 
indicators would you use for performance tracking?" (WMS label: perf2). Column 4: "How frequent do you review these performance 
indicators?" (WMS label: perf3). Column 5: "How are these performance review meetings structured?" (WMS label: perf4). Column 6: "What 
would happen if a follow up plan agreed during one of your meetings were not enacted?" (WMS label: perf5). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.


























∆ Industry Sales 0.521 -0.244 -0.260 -0.153 -0.243 -0.216 0.026 -0.149 -0.210 -0.182
(0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.026) (0.057) (0.094) (0.039) (0.129) (0.036)
Ownership Level × ∆ Industry Sales 0.061 0.066 0.066 0.061 0.089 -0.001 0.033 0.042 0.085 0.085
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.017) (0.024) (0.010) (0.030) (0.009)
Share Equity Stakes × ∆ Industry Sales -0.112 -0.105 -0.186 0.021 -0.162
(0.027) (0.072) (0.034) (0.104) (0.031)
Ownership Level × ∆ Industry Sales × Dummy 
for Crisis Years -0.128
(0.015)
Share Equity Stakes × ∆ Industry Sales × 
Dummy for Crisis Years 0.071
(0.031)
Ownership Level -0.135 -0.047 -0.046 -0.045 -0.051 -0.040 -0.045 -0.040 -0.036 -0.026
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004)
Share Equity Stakes 0.045 0.034 0.055 -0.006 0.037
(0.015) (0.029) (0.020) (0.048) (0.015)
ln(Salest-3) -0.156 0.050 -0.053 -0.050 -0.051 -0.061 -0.054 -0.040 -0.047 -0.050
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002)
Firm age 0.005 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.022 0.014 0.013 0.016
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
∆ Industry Sales × Dummy for Crisis Years 0.249
(0.049)
Ownership Level × Dummy for Crisis Years -0.046
(0.003)
Share Equity Stakes × Dummy for Crisis 0.015
(0.015)
Corporate Group FEs Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry FEs Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corporate Group × 3-Digit Industry FEs No No Yes No No No No No No No
Year-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 465,411 465,411 465,411 465,411 363,221 101,641 69,049 276,826 35,523 465,411
No. of corporate groups 39,267 39,267 39,267 39,267 35,681 10,080 5,291 19,557 2,250 39,267
No. of affiliates 119,772 119,772 119,772 119,772 93,517 26,255 17,770 71,605 9,773 119,772
R-squared 0.362 0.309 0.315 0.310 0.318 0.318 0.243 0.309 0.408 0.311
Table 5. Responsiveness to Industry Growth and Ownership Level
Dependent variable: Sales Growth Affiliate - Sales Growth Standalone
Notes: This table presents results on how the difference in responsiveness to industry growth between group affiliates and standalone firms varies with the ownership level of the affiliate in 
the group. Industry growth is computed at the 3-year level and cover the period 2002-2011. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity through clustering by group affiliates.















Ownership Level × ∆ Industry Sales × Dummy for Same Industry -0.085
(0.029)







Ownership Level × ∆ Industry Sales × Overlap Affiliate Name -0.036
(0.018)
Ownership Level × ∆ Industry Sales × Dummy for Same Region -0.129
(0.045)
Ownership Level × ∆ Industry Sales 0.067 0.068 0.085 0.055 0.068 0.071
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010)
Ownership Level ×  Dummy for Same Industry 0.008
(0.026)
∆ Industry Sales ×  Dummy for Same Industry 0.167
(0.076)
Ownership Level ×  Dummy for Family Managers -0.024
(0.013)
∆ Industry Sales ×  Dummy for Family Managers 0.085
(0.054)
Ownership Level ×  Dummy for Same Ethnicity -0.004
(0.005)
∆ Industry Sales ×  Dummy for Same Ethnicity -0.012
(0.027)
Ownership Level ×  Dummy for Board Interlocks 0.009
(0.005)
∆ Industry Sales ×  Dummy for Board Interlocks 0.029
(0.043)
Ownership Level ×  Overlap Affiliate Name -0.013
(0.005)
∆ Industry Sales ×   Overlap Affiliate Name 0.014
(0.043)
Ownership Level ×  Dummy for Same Region -0.027
(0.019)
∆ Industry Sales ×  Dummy for Same Region 0.305
(0.105)
Ownership Level -0.031 -0.045 -0.045 -0.044 -0.037 -0.035
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆ Industry Sales -0.271 -0.241 -0.205 -0.238 -0.225 -0.296
(0.034) (0.025) (0.035) (0.026) (0.036) (0.030)
Firm Age 0.013 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Salest-3) -0.045 -0.050 -0.049 -0.050 -0.049 -0.054
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Dummy for Same Industry -0.002
(0.026)
Dummy for Family Managers 0.039
(0.012)
Dummy for Same Ethnicity 0.014
(0.015)
Dummy for Board Interlocks -0.046
(0.013)
Dummy for Overlap Affiliate Name 0.063
(0.012)
Dummy for Same Region 0.051
(0.044)
Corporate Group FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 465,411 465,411 359,481 465,411 465,411 465,411
No. of corporate groups 39,267 39,267 33,996 39,267 39,267 39,267
No. of affiliates 119,772 119,772 92,385 119,772 119,772 119,772
R-squared 0.333 0.331 0.324 0.331 0.322 0.326
Table 6. Responsiveness to Industry Growth and Ownership Level: Variation by subsidiary characteristics 
Dependent variable: Sales Growth Affiliate - Sales Growth Standalone
Notes: This table presents results on how the difference in responsiveness to industry growth between group affiliates and standalone firms varies with 
ownership level and subsidiary characteristics. Industry growth is computed at the 3-year level and cover the period 2002-2011. Same Industry 
(Column 1) is a dummy variable that receives the value of one for affiliates that are in the same 3-digit SIC code as the apex firm, and zero for all the 
other affiliates.  Family Managers (Column 2) is a dummy variable that receives the value of one for affiliates with managers that have the same last 
name as at least one shareholder that owns at least 5% of the total group assets, and zero for all the other affiliates. Same Ethnicity (Column 3) is a 
dummy variable that receives the value of one for affiliates with a manager's ethnicity that is the same as the ethnicity of at least one manager of the 
apex firm, and zero for all the other affiliates. Board interlocks (Colunm 4) is a dummy variable that receives the value of one for affiliates with at least 
one board member who is also a board member of the apex firm, and zero for all the other affilates. Overlap Affiliate Name (Column 5) is a dummy 
variable that receives the value of one for affiliates with a common name as the apex firm and zero for all the other affiliates. Same Region is a dummy 
variable that receives the value of one for affiliates that are in the same 4-digit NUTS code as the apex firm, and zero for all the other affiliates. 
Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity through clustering by group affiliates.
